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Introduction 
To state that the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR” or “the Court”) has become a 
victim of its own success is an oft-repeated mantra. Yet to ring the death knell for what is 
undoubtedly the most successful international human rights project is premature. While the 
Court is facing an unsustainable caseload under its current formation, the solution is not to 
abandon the Court altogether, but to find a structure that facilitates the accommodation of this 
burdensome caseload. While Protocol 14 - permitting a single judge to rule on admissibility - 
has eased the Court backlog somewhat,2 this impact has only been on cases which are ‘clearly 
inadmissible’. Reform of the Court is still needed if it is to adequately deal with the huge 
numbers of cases that meet the requirement of admissibility, and the backlog of such cases 
that have yet to be adjudicated upon.3 
In this article, we argue that although the large backlog of cases currently stifling the ECtHR 
is a direct result of the individual complaints procedure, nevertheless, the importance of this 
procedure as the “crown jewel”4 in the ECHR system cannot be foregone. Our proposed 
model for restructuring the ECtHR preserves such right of individual petition while 
facilitating the expedition of constitutionalist complaints. We argue that Chambers of the 
ECtHR should focus on adjudicatory cases and their procedure should be simplified, whereas 
the Grand Chamber should be reserved for pronouncing upon constitutionalist issues only. 
While Draft Protocols 15 and 16 contain provisions that can emphasise the separation 
between the adjudicatory function of the Chambers and constitutionalist function of the 
Grand Chamber, we argue that further reforms may be needed and these reforms should be 
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based on the idea of functional separation between the Grand Chamber and other Court’s 
formations.  
1. The Dual Functionality of the European Court of Human Rights 
It has been argued that the raison d’etre of the ECtHR is that “it will hear any case, from 
anyone who claims to be a victim of the Convention”.5 It has also been suggested, however, 
that the Court is incapable of providing individual justice to all applicants and consequently a 
mechanism for the selection of cases based on their importance should be introduced. These 
suggestions were not, however, endorsed by some stakeholders6 who argue that the 
legitimacy and authoritativeness of the ECtHR is dependent on the availability of individual 
justice and therefore the right to individual petition ought to be considered sacrosanct.7  
Consequently, Paul Mahoney points out that the Convention’s mission is “indissoluble from 
the right of individual petition.”8 Relatedly, the Court should not avoid adjudication of 
repetitive cases as it can influence State parties through the reiteration of a particular rule in 
repetitive meritorious cases.9 The role of the ECtHR in providing just satisfaction for 
aggrieved petitioners is incredibly important for the legitimacy of the Court in the eyes of 
those that petition it. Similarly, from a rule of law perspective, the admissibility or grounds 
for each petitioner should remain the same, with such grounds articulated clearly beforehand 
in order to maximise clarity and certainty of the legal norms involved. 
Despite this apparent importance of the adjudicatory function of the ECtHR, in late 2012 and 
early 2013 two articles were published in leading human rights journals in which the 
adjudicatory function of the ECtHR was challenged. Fiona de Londras argues that the 
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adjudicatory function of the Court creates a “logistical nightmare” for the Court and allows 
the Council of Europe and the Contracting Parties to rely too heavily on the Court instead of 
“developing an autonomous jurisprudence on the Convention at the domestic level.”10 
Relatedly, Steven Greer and Luzius Wildhaber offer a powerful critique of the adjudicatory 
function of the Court, arguing that the Court is simply incapable of consistent adjudication of 
individual complaints which in turn prevents the Court from fulfilling “its constitutional 
mission”.11 Greer and Wildhaber therefore propose to select and adjudicate cases ‘in a much 
more strategically focused manner than at present’.12 de Londras also concludes that the 
adjudicatory function of the Court should be curtailed and instead it should concentrate on 
more significant cases, i.e. constitutionalist issues. 
Notwithstanding these persuasive critiques, we argue that the adjudicatory function of the 
Court is crucial for maintenance of the Court’s influence and that the arguments eloquently 
presented by de Londras, and Greer and Wildhaber do not offer widely acceptable or 
politically practical solutions for resolving the current crisis. We therefore offer a model 
which would keep adjudicatory functions and at the same time promote the constitutionalist 
hypostasis of the ECtHR. 
Before turning to our argument, some terminological clarifications are necessary. An 
‘individual application’ (or ‘individual petition’) is an application lodged before the Court 
according to Article 34 of the Convention. Due to the importance of the individual 
application procedure outlined above, it is rare that commentators suggest that this right to 
individual petition as such should be abandoned altogether.13 However, the right to bring a 
petition and the right for this petition to be dealt with by the Court are two different issues. 
Greer and Wildhaber argue that under the individual justice model, the Court exists ‘for the 
benefit of the particular individual… with whatever constitutional or systemic improvements 
at the national level might thereby result.’14 Therefore, under this system all meritorious cases 
should be adjudicated. The consequence of individual justice is that the Court has to deal with 
adjudicatory cases which are repetitive and in which the Court ‘is asked to play a de facto 
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appellate function’.15 de Londras, and Greer and Wildhaber in their respective articles suggest 
that the model of individual justice is unsustainable and the Court should turn towards a 
constitutional model of justice.16 
The concept of a ‘constitutionalist model’ is not a straightforward term. For de Londras, 
constitutionalist cases are those in which the ECtHR is ‘clarifying standards, holding states to 
account for them, and sometimes developing those standards beyond their literal 
conceptions.’17 Wildhaber argues that there are at least three possible understandings of 
constitutionalisation. First, the fact that the ECtHR, despite being designed as a bulwark 
against totalitarianism turned into a court more akin to a normal national constitutional court 
enforcing a Bill of Rights.18 Second, democracy and human rights are constitutionalist 
principles, therefore securing these principles makes the ECtHR constitutionalist or at least 
quasi-constitutionalist.19 Finally, constitutionalisation is seen as an analytical tool that can 
distinguish between trivial adjudicatory decisions and more serious constitutionalist 
judgments.20 This latter definition is more helpful in the context of this paper. Greer and 
Wildhaber convincingly state that the ECtHR possesses constitutional characteristics21 but we 
argue that this status of the ECtHR is not incompatible with it being an adjudicatory court 
bringing justice to individual applicants. We argue therefore that the Court should remain 
with both adjudicatory and constitutionalist functions in its jurisprudence but these two 
functions should be clearly distinguished and different reforms should be developed to 
optimise the Court’s performance in relation to these two functions.  
 
2. Distinguishing constitutionalist complaints from adjudicatory decisions 
An alternative approach to curtailing the system of individual justice would, we suggest, be to 
separate the adjudicatory and constitutionalist functions of the ECtHR; placing an emphasis 
of resources through structural reform on the latter function and thus enabling the Court to 
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strengthen its constitutionalist hypostasis. However, despite this suggestion being more 
modest than abandonment or significant curtailment of the adjudicatory function, the idea of 
separating these functions has not yet been universally accepted. One of the fundamental 
reasons why proposals to separate the Court’s functions are not always welcomed is the 
inability to establish a clear typology of constitutionalist issues. 
On the basis of various definitions of constitutionalism,22 constitutionalist cases are firstly 
those that deal with novel issues, never before presented to the ECtHR. These ‘novel’ cases 
provide a lens through which the scope of the treaty can be delineated. The second type of 
constitutionalist cases are those which are of particular significance for the State concerned. 
This includes endemic violations which are repetitive and embedded in a particular legal 
system. In such instances the ECtHR has to emphasise the importance of the problem and 
urge the Contracting Party to solve the issue. Such judgments can summarise and codify the 
approach which was elaborated through the adjudicatory function.23 The third definition of a 
‘constitutionalist issue’ are allegations of serious human rights violations.  These are cases 
where the nature of the human rights breach is of such severity as to undermine a Contracting 
Party’s commitment to the Convention and consequently the legitimacy of the Convention 
itself.24  Therefore, a once off breach of the Convention may be of such severity that it may 
on its own be of sufficient importance to constitute a constitutionalist issue.25 
These three categories are, however, not wholly satisfactory because they do not set clear 
criteria for distinguishing constitutionalist from adjudicatory cases. If the constitutionalist 
nature of a complaint becomes an admissibility criterion then the divide between adjudicatory 
and constitutionalist cases must be very clear. 
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As mentioned above, constitutionalist issues are often a result of judgments in numerous 
repetitive cases which reveal endemic violations of human rights in a particular country or 
region.26 Therefore, in some instances, a significant number of similar applications may turn 
adjudicatory cases into a constitutionalist issue. If a Contracting Party continues to flout the 
Convention and explicit decisions of the Court, this seriously undermines the efficacy of the 
Court in securing the Conventions goals, as well as bringing into question a Contracting 
Party’s commitment to the European human right project. If the Court does not react to this 
situation this may foster apathy both among the applicants due to a lack of just satisfaction 
and perceived emasculation of the Court, and also amongst other Contracting Parties, given 
their commitment to the perceived norms that are being habitually violated. 
The importance of identifying constitutionalist issues relatedly facilitates the recognition of a 
case that is only adjudicatory in nature: cases that do not clarify further the previously 
established limits of state power; that do not involve serious breaches of human rights; that 
do not clarify dichotomous jurisprudence, that may be decided according to current existent 
jurisprudence and that are of primary importance only to the parties involved. However, 
while one can broadly identify two distinct categories of cases when looking at the 
jurisprudence of the Court as a whole, labelling individual cases as constitutionalist or 
adjudicatory is a much more nuanced pursuit.  
Greer and Wildhaber also discuss the challenge of separating constitutionalist and 
adjudicatory cases. They, however, argue that the difficulties in selecting constitutionalist 
cases do not undermine the value of the constitutionalist model.27 They offer five reasons 
why selection of cases is not a problem. First, they argue that national constitutional courts 
often have broad discretion in the selection of cases they are willing to adjudicate.28 
However, some national constitutional courts become overly politicised in a large part 
precisely because they select cases on the basis of importance.29 Second, domestic 
constitutional courts despite selecting cases on the basis of discretion are nevertheless seen as 
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more legitimate than other public institutions.30 A much more detailed analysis of this 
argument is needed but even if this assertion is correct the ECtHR cannot be directly 
compared to national constitutional courts in terms of political legitimacy. Judges of the 
ECtHR come from different states with different agendas in mind and unlimited discretion in 
selection of the cases can seriously undermine standard setting capacity of the Court. Third, 
the criterion of significance will not be more unpredictable than the currently applied 
rejection of cases on the grounds that they are ‘manifestly ill-founded’. This is a strong 
argument; indeed, sometimes it is not entirely clear why the Court declares certain 
applications manifestly ill-founded.31 However, if the constitutional model is accepted, 
rejection of justice will be conducted on a much bigger scale. Currently only some 
applications are declared inadmissible based on the manifestly ill-founded criterion. If the 
constitutional model is accepted, only a fraction of applications will be dealt with because 
they pose a question of constitutional significance. Fourth, the individual justice model 
neither increases the Court’s legitimacy nor has any ‘pedagogical function’.32 One can argue 
that the rejection of thousands of applications without even minimal explanation would not 
enhance legitimacy of the ECtHR either. At least under the status quo, when rejecting a 
complaint the Court states that it did not fulfil admissibility criteria which are known and 
accessible. If the Court only adjudicates vaguely defined important cases this might put the 
trust of stakeholders in the ECtHR at risk. Fifth, the Court will be able to spend more time on 
issues of high importance.33 The model we suggest would allow the Court to deal with very 
serious issues but at the same time would not undermine legitimacy of the Court by 
introducing constitutionality as an admissibility criterion. 
We submit therefore that amending admissibility criteria to exclude adjudicatory complaints 
is too drastic an approach to undertake when codifying what constitutes a ‘constitutionalist 
issue’ is such a difficult task. Notwithstanding this difficulty, however, the identification of 
constitutionalist and adjudicatory complaints can be a useful tool for the more modest 
function of distributing the Court’s resources between these two functions. 
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3. Facilitating Dual Functionality: Separating Adjudicatory and Constitutionalist 
Justice  
While we argue that the Court should maintain its adjudicatory function, this does not mean 
that this function should prevent the Court from allocating more resources into the more 
important function of constitutionalist justice. Therefore, we suggest that the dual functions 
of the Court should be clearly separated, with different formations of the Court hearing 
adjudicatory and constitutionalist cases respectively and the resources of the Court distributed 
accordingly. The adjudicatory function of the Court should become less burdensome through 
simplification of the admissibility procedure, developing formal, consistent and clear rules of 
application, or even through referral the repetitious application to the competence of the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. The processing of the adjudicatory 
function needs to be clearly located within the Chambers of the Court and consequently the 
Chambers should not be concerned with the constitutionalist aspects of the Court’s case law. 
The Chambers should mostly deal with cases that cannot be called constitutionalist or “hard 
cases”.34 In cases when such aspects do arise, Chambers should relinquish such cases to the 
Grand Chamber. 
The predominant focus of the Grand Chamber on constitutionalist issues is arguably the de 
facto situation in the Court at present. However, we submit that the dual functionality of the 
court is, nevertheless still dispersed between the Chambers and the Grand Chamber. On the 
one hand the Chambers can deliver constitutionalist judgments including pilot judgments.35 
Engagement of the Chambers in constitutionalist matters creates a few substantial 
disadvantages: firstly, it takes the resources allocated to the Chambers from simple 
adjudicatory cases into more complex constitutionalist cases which, among other issues, 
require more substantive and consistent reasoning and more profound background research. 
Secondly, judgments delivered at Chamber level might create certain fragmentation in the 
case law of the ECtHR as diverging opinions on factually similar cases may be issued by the 
various Chambers (different Sections of the Court).36 These conflicting precedents would be 
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detrimental for the authority of ECtHR judgments. Thirdly, consideration of a hard case by 
the Chamber which can be followed by the consideration of the Grand Chamber duplicates 
the work of the Court. 
Under the current system there are two ways for a case to appear before the Grand Chamber. 
First the case can be relinquished by the Chamber according to Article 30 of the Convention 
which provides that where a case pending before a Chamber raises a serious question, or 
where the resolution of a question before the Chamber might have a result inconsistent with a 
judgment previously delivered by the Court, the Chamber may, at any time before it has 
rendered its judgment, relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber, unless one of 
the parties to the case objects. While this test covers some constitutionalist issues it does not 
cover all of them. As stated previously, constitutionalist issues also arise from novel 
situations and endemic violations that require a structural reform in the Contracting Party. 
Therefore, the reasons for relinquishment should be formulated in more precise terms. 
The on-going reform of the Court is inclined towards strengthening the constitutionalist role 
of the Grand Chamber. The Brighton declaration acknowledges the central role of the Grand 
Chamber in achieving consistency in the Court’s jurisprudence.37 Under the current system, 
parties can object to the decision of the Chamber to relinquish its jurisdiction to the Grand 
Chamber. This provision is in line with the Court’s role as a provider of individual justice 
where it is up to the parties to choose the appropriate forum for adjudication of their dispute. 
However, the will of the parties is irrelevant in consideration of whether the issue is 
constitutionalist or not. The draft Protocol 15 enshrines provisions designed to strengthen the 
constitutionalist role of the Grand Chamber through removing the objection clause from the 
Convention.38 This would intensify the constitutionalist role of the Grand Chamber and 
therefore we endorse this proposition. 
Secondly, pursuant to Article 43 of the Convention a case can be heard by the Grand 
Chamber if a committee of five judges decides so following a request from one of the parties 
to the case after the Chamber has delivered its initial judgment. We submit that under the 
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suggested system the parties should not have a procedural right of referral. Rather, such an 
argument would have to be framed in terms of whether the case raises a constitutionalist issue 
or not. It would therefore be for the individual Chamber to decide, rather than a panel of five 
judges of the Grand Chamber. While this issue may be rather cumbersome at first, it is 
submitted that the gradual build-up of precedent would eventually assist judges in making 
swift, clear decisions grounded in the rule of law. This would in turn save a certain amount of 
resources. Under this system the Chambers would be able to determine if a case raises novel 
legal issues and endemic violations and request the Grand Chamber to adopt an authoritative 
ruling in a particular case. 
In assessing whether a constitutionalist issue arises, we submit that the Chamber should take 
an in depth look at facts and legal issues raised by the case. The test should be whether the 
Chamber considers that a constitutionalist issue has been raised and that accordingly, 
jurisdiction is relieved for the Grand Chamber to hear the case. This should be contrasted to a 
less strict approach whereby a petitioner would only raise an arguable question as to whether 
or not a constitutionalist issue is raised in the case, and the Court on foot of a preliminary 
hearing of arguments, refers this arguable question to the Grand Chamber. 
When the functions of the Chambers and the Grand Chamber are clearly separated, the 
procedure in the Chambers could be intensified, the judgments should not require profound 
reasoning, and some judgments could be delivered summarily when the Committees or 
Chambers would simply implement the case law rules adopted by the Grand Chamber. While 
this system would sufficiently intensify the procedure on the level of admissibility and 
adjudicatory justice, it would not leave any complaints unanswered, which makes such a 
system more appropriate than changing the Strasbourg system to a system of purely 
constitutional justice as suggested by Greer and Wildhaber.39 
The constitutionalist nature of Grand Chamber rulings will be enhanced by the proposed 
advisory opinion mechanism contained in the draft Protocol 16. Pursuant to this Protocol the 
‘highest courts and tribunals of a High Contracting Party’ will be able to petition the ECtHR 
for an advisory opinion on the implementation of the Convention at a domestic level.40 This 
proposed change would not affect our suggested reconfiguration of the Court as such 
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questions, if accepted by a Chamber of five judges, would be heard by the Grand Chamber.41 
As such questions would deal with ‘questions of principle relating to the interpretation or 
application of the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention or the Protocols thereto,’42 
these questions would fall within the constitutionalist nature of the ECtHR.  
4. Conclusion 
The European Court of Human Rights is facing a crisis which the preservation of the status 
quo will only exacerbate. New ideas must be put forward in a bid to solve the problems the 
current system faces. However, these solutions must operate mostly within the rigid barriers 
that currently exist in the system, most notably its budgetary limits. In the near future, it is 
highly unlikely that there will be any substantial increases in the resources available to the 
Court. Bearing this in mind, we have endeavoured to shape a model for the Court’s future 
that would enhance the Court’s constitutionalist jurisdiction, without sacrificing the 
‘sacrosanct’ right of individual petition. Our approach of separating adjudicatory complaints 
from constitutionalist issues, with constitutionalist issues referred to the Grand Chamber and 
adjudicatory complaints heard by Chambers strives to satisfy the above conditions laid out.  
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